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Military techno-vision is decidedly opaque. We – the public in whose name they are developed 
and deployed – are never quite allowed to scrutinize how exactly it operates, or what kind of 
work it performs. For a long time, military techno-vision was related to the optical qualities of 
the human eye. It was either about enhancing the natural human eye, seeing further, seeing in 
less light, seeing from different locations, or about mimicking the human eye, creating spatial 
awareness and navigation capabilities from the singular point of the eye/camera. Today, 
increasingly, militarized techno-vision is not merely about the production but also the 
interpretation of images, about the mind rather than the eye, to use the anthropomorphic 
language that dominates high-tech discourse. This shift from optics to procession, vision or 
understanding is related to the development of precision optics and the resulting flood of 
images that threatens to overwhelm the security bureaucracies seeking to optimize lethal 
vision. The contemporary problem, thus, is not overcoming invisibility but rather how to 
efficiently manage a flood of opaque images. 
The solution, proposed by militaries as simultaneously benign and efficient, is to delegate 
image interpretation to machines. In this paper, I ask how we can scrutinize and interrogate 
the agency of such machine vision systems when we as a public are rarely granted access to 
the operations they perform. First, I briefly explore current machine vision technologies, and 
the technological projects that have identified their blind spots. Second, I look to artistic 
image production as a means to help think about militarized vision and pictorial agency. 
Machine vision. Art Photography. Security. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Military precision optics and, increasingly, 
automated forms of military techno-vision play 
crucial roles in the assemblages that manage and 
make sense of global politics, making sense of 
sociality and inscribing categorizations and lethal 
decisions in different quotidian realities of the 
‘everywhere war’ (Gregory, 2011; Tazzioli and 
Walters, 2016; Walters, 2014). In this paper, I ask 
how we can make sense of the sense-making 
activities of military techno-vision systems that we 
are not given access to observe. I argue that while 
western publics are asked to place their trust in 
these systems, a cloak of invisibility shields military 
techno-optics from civilian oversight or insight – 
attempts to see through or with them. In contrast to 
the superhuman vision they allegedly provide, the 
systems are kept opaque and inaccessible for the 
western publics who are not allowed to peer through 
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their scopes or to scrutinize the code that they 
implement onto the world. 
In this exploratory short paper, I ask how we can 
scrutinize and interrogate the agency of such 
machine vision systems when we as a public are 
rarely granted access to the operations they 
perform. 
Critical understanding can depart from the videos 
made publicly available – predominantly
promotional videos published by western militaries 
applying military techno-vision in war, but the 
semiotic techniques applied in such promotional 
material serves to mask the confusion of the 
battlefield and render alternative understandings 
unlikely. Likewise, even if the ‘collateral murder’ 
video leaked by Chelsea Manning – by far the most 
prominent actual documentation of the air-war 
practices developed under the continuations of the 
war on terror - provided a strong indictment of the 
practices of warfare guided by precision optics, I 
have argued elsewhere that authorities were able to 
largely brush this critique aside by deploying what I 
call a ‘semiotic fog of war’ that disenables their visual 
critique (Andersen, 2015). 
To make sense of the sense-making done in and by 
military techno-vison, we also have to look 
elsewhere, to decidedly non-documentarist images. 
In Richard Mosse’s artworks ‘the enclave’, military 
film designed to reveal what is invisible to the 
unassisted eye is used to photograph a little-known 
war, decades-long conflict in eastern Congo. Here, 
western spectators do not easily identify and classify 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ actors, forcing us to think differently. 
By rendering the conflict a beautiful and surreal 
mess that is hard to read ‘operationally’, the 
photographs serve as an invitation for us to see the 
interpretative work done through but also left to 
soldiers by technological enhanced forms of military 
vision. In the following, I first briefly explore the 
infrastructuring of current machine vision 
technologies in relation to security, and some of the 
technological projects that have identified their blind 
spots. Arguing that the degree to which we can 
make sense of such systems based on this kind of 
knowledge is not fully satisfactory, I, second, look to 
Mosse’s artistic image production as a means to 
help think about militarized vision and pictorial 
agency. 
2. MACHINES, VISION, AND SECURITY
After decades of development of ever-more 
powerful surveillance technology, the problem of 
visuality for security services is no longer sensing or 
optics, it is vision (or understanding). Terrorism 
attacks such as the 2012 Breivik leave the 
authorities with tens of thousands of hours of 
relevant surveillance footage to review (Norwegian 
Police Security Service (PST), g). Half a decade 
ago, in 2011, ‘the US Air Force [had] amassed over 
325,000 hours of drone video—that’s about 37 years 
of video’ and today a ‘single drone with these 
sensors produces many terabytes of data every day. 
Before AI was incorporated into analysis of this data, 
it took a team of analysts working 24 hours a day to 
exploit only a fraction of one drone’s sensor data’ 
(Allen, 2017). These are not only data problems, as 
already in 2010 the fog of war had become digital in 
the sense that the US had took to blame drone 
strikes targeting civilians on ‘information overload’ 
(Johnson and Wald, 2017). Currently, the situation 
is thus that ‘the defense intelligence community is 
currently drowning in data. Every day, US spy 
planes and satellites collect more raw data than the 
Defense Department could analyze even if its whole 
workforce spent their entire lives on it’ (Allen, 2017) 
Machine vision, the development of neural network 
technology to categorise content in images and 
search for patterns in them or for matches with 
existing database is the current proposition for 
turning observation into the militarised version of 
understanding, actionable intelligence. Not being an 
engineer, I entered the field of machine vision 
software through controversies that are accessible 
to outsiders, starting from the training and testing 
image databases and from there working my way 
towards machine vision systems that are trained 
through them and the visual culture they inherit from 
such databases. 
2.1 Training databases, ambiguity and ground 
truth 
The most widely used training image database, 
ImageNet is built by having search engines look for 
images following simple descriptors in major search 
engines, i.e. consists of images harvested online 
(Deng et al., 2009, p. 251). Search engine images, 
of course, are not entirely unbiased, and the 
constructors of ImageNet remark that ‘[t]o further 
enlarge and diversify the candidate pool, we 
translate the queries into other languages, including 
Chinese, Spanish, Dutch and Italian’ (Deng et al., 
2009, p. 251). 
Images are described and categorized using the 
labour-sourcing portal Mechanical Turk, where 
workers get paid in fractions of cents for each very 
small job done, to produce and verify descriptions 
before entering the image into the database which in 
2014 ‘contain[ed] 14,197,122 annotated images 
organized by the semantic hierarchy of WordNet’ 
(Russakovsky et al., 2014, pp. 7, 3). The database 
contains more than twenty thousand categories of 
objects that machine vision systems can then be 
trained to recognize. The database hosts an annual 
machine vision competition in which systems 
compete in image classification - which ‘tests the 
ability of an algorithm to name the objects present in 
the image, without necessarily localizing them’; 
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object detection and localization – which ‘evaluates 
the ability of an algorithm to localize one instance of 
an object category; and object detection – which 
evaluates the ability of an algorithm to name and 
localize all instances of all target objects present in 
an image (Russakovsky et al., 2014, pp. 5, 8, 10). 
The competition is based on images harvested from 
Flickr (Russakovsky et al., 2014, p. 4) and has been 
credited with contributing to the recent acceleration 
in advances in deep learning following a 
breakthrough made in the 2012 contest (The 
Economist, 2016). 
A later database, Microsoft Common Objects in 
Context (MS COCO), is constructed using Flick 
images against the idea that ‘current recognition 
systems perform fairly well on iconic views, but 
struggle to recognize objects otherwise – in the 
background, partially occluded, amid clutter – 
reflecting the composition of actual everyday 
scenes.’ (Lin et al., 2015, p. 1). This is the result of 
ImageNet (and other datasets’) images being 
sourced primarily through search engine querying, 
producing ‘iconic’ images in which the sought-after 
object or attribute is paramount, leading to images 
that according to the MS COCO developers ‘lack 
important contextual information and non-canonical 
viewpoints’ (Lin et al., 2015, p. 4)In such settings,  
‘Object category presence is often ambiguous. 
Indeed … even dedicated experts often disagree on 
object presence, e.g. due to inherent ambiguity in 
the image or disagreement about category 
definitions (Lin et al., 2015, p. 6). Yet, as machine 
teaching goes, the dataset still works by assigning a 
‘ground truth’, ‘computed using majority vote of the 
experts’ (Lin et al., 2015, p. 6) to denote what the 
image ‘truly’ contains. 
Several features of these datasets are interesting. 
One is about what kind of use people’s images are 
put to without their knowing – which is perhaps not 
so intuitively alarming when developing machine 
vision in general but attain a different ethical depth 
once machine vision is combined with weapons or 
surveillance systems. Even if freely available online, 
should unknown people’s images been subjected to 
this kind of use without their consent? And by relying 
heavily on Flickr and image search engines, 
machine vision system learns from and within the 
specific visual culture that is Flickr or that is already 
monetised by search engines. A rather funny 
illustration of this from machine vision is from an 
allegory told in an Economist editorial, about the 
‘unsupervised’ discovery of classes of objects: 
‘Google Brain in which a giant unsupervised learning 
system was asked to look for common patterns in 
thousands of unlabelled YouTube videos. One day 
one of Mr Ng’s PhD students had a surprise for him. 
“I remember him calling me over to his computer and 
saying, ‘look at this’,” Mr Ng recalls. On the screen 
was a furry face, a pattern distilled from thousands 
of examples. The system had discovered cats.´ (The 
Economist, 2016). Anybody familiar with YouTube 
and the output of its recommendation algorithms 
(Saugmann Andersen, 2017) will know that cats are 
at the apex of an enormous video-industrial 
complex, making the discovery of cats also a 
feedback loop discovering algorithmic governance, 
rather than merely furry animals. 
Given the importance of and difficulty with datasets 
for developing machine vision systems, these will 
likely also be an issue for surveillance and military 
applications of machine vision. Training datasets are 
thus, unsurprisingly, an issue in publicly known 
military applications of machine vision. The most 
well-known, Project Maven, a US Department of 
Defense project to establish an Algorithmic Warfare 
Cross-Function Team, was widely reported in 2018 
due to the revelation that Google was involved 
despite promises to not weaponise artificial 
intelligence, and the subsequent protests by Google 
employees. 
The project’s ‘objective is to turn the enormous 
volume of data available to the DoD into actionable 
intelligence and insights at speed’, with the project’s 
first task to ‘organize a data-labeling effort, and 
develop, acquire, and/or modify algorithms to 
accomplish key tasks’, these being to ‘reduce the 
human factors burden [i.e. labour needs] of FMV 
[Full-Motion Video] analysis, increase actionable 
intelligence, and enhance military decision-making’ 
(Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2017). Project Maven 
thus ‘seeks to automate basic labeling and analysis 
associated with full-motion video surveillance' 
(Johnson and Wald, 2017) and ‘focuses on analysis 
of full-motion video data from tactical aerial drone 
platforms such as the ScanEagle and medium- 
altitude platforms such as the MQ-1C Gray Eagle 
and the MQ-9 Reaper.’ (Allen, 2017), some of the 
drones responsible for the visual data deluge. 
Even if Maven focuses on one class of images only, 
the differences in training data are striking. 
‘In Maven’s case, humans had to individually label 
more than 150,000 images in order to establish the 
first training data sets; the group hopes to have 1 
million images in the training data set by the end of 
January [2018] (Allen, 2017). Whether one or the 
other – noting that hopes and future promises in 
military technology are unlikely to describe any 
reality – the paucity of training images is striking 
compared to the lethal applications the software is 
aimed at, and the way in which ImageNet’s 14 
million images were described above as mainly 
giving ‘iconic’ views of the objects identified in them. 
The approach to deal with the lack of labelled data 
seems to be one of limiting the capabilities of the 
system – or, if we adopt the anthropomorphic lingo 
of artificial intelligence and machine vison, one of 
visual stupidity. Maven’s 'immediate focus is 38 
classes of objects that represent the kinds of things 
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the department needs to detect, especially in the 
fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.' 
(Pellerin, 2017). While it may be desirable to start 
out with a narrow focus, such a focus obviously 
doesn’t alter the ambiguity and multiplicity that is the 
‘ground truth’ lived on the ground, it only sharpens 
the reductionist elements of the machinic ‘ground 
truth’. 
Militarized machine vision will need training datasets 
that not only permits the systems learning from them 
to segment objects and distinguish between them 
but also be highly sensitive to context (think of a 
fighter with a gun versus a farmer with a gun) and 
visual culture (e.g. similar gestures with different 
cultural meanings). 
2.2 Machine misrecognition 
Seeking to get an idea of how machine vision works, 
and which controversies are debated within the 
community developing it, I eventually arrived at 
Google’s publicly available image description and 
object identification systems. These, I thought, 
would have to stand in for the secret but probably 
similar systems that I suspected would be at worked 
in military image databases, and this section was 
written on that background. 
Yet the connection between in the first months of 
2018, it was revealed that Google was indeed 
providing machine vision services to the US 
Department of Defense, through Project Maven. The 
descriptions of this project as an effort that ‘will 
‘provide computer vision algorithms for object 
detection, classification, and alerts for FMV [full - 
motion video] PED [processing, exploitation, and 
dissemination]’ (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2017) 
brought uncanny memories of the features I had 
laughed at in descriptions of the image description 
and object labelling system. 
Google’s image description and object identification 
system works throght combining different neural 
networks, as shown in figure 1, combining machine 
vision with natural language processing. 
Figure 1: Figure 2: Representation of Google’s image 
description and object identification system (Vinyals et 
al., 2015, p. 1) 
The use value of this combination lies partly in its 
making images compatible with other database 
objects, and easily searchable through the keywords 
and object descriptors generated. This epistemic 
rendering of the image rests on, firstly, an 
understanding of images as transparent or non- 
distorting – what can be termed an aesthetic of 
immediacy (cf. Bolter and Grusin, 2000). Secondly, 
it rests on an understanding of reality as limited and 
un-ambiguous. These properties are striking in 
Google’s description of its machine vision system: 
‘“Two pizzas sitting on top of a stove top oven” “A 
group of people shopping at an outdoor market” 
“Best seats in the house” People can summarize a 
complex scene in a few words without thinking twice. 
It’s much more difficult for computers. But we’ve just 
gotten a bit closer -- we’ve developed a machine- 
learning system that can automatically produce 
captions (like the three above) to accurately 
describe images the first time it sees them.’ (Vinyals 
et al., 2014) 
The claims above are strikingly at odds with the 
understanding of images that one would get from 
visual studies, visual culture studies, visual 
semiotics or the like – and the sentences do not 
sound like how most people would describe any 
scene or image, yet the creators assure that the 
system meets state-of-the-art thresholds and comes 
close to ‘human performance’ (Vinyals et al., 2015) 
even with the added difficulty of formulating image 
captions in sentences. The problem that concerns 
us at the moment, though, is not whether or not 
images can be reduced to ground truths, but rather 
the technological fragility of this translation. 
In an intriguing article titled ‘Deep Neural Networks 
are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for 
Unrecognizable Images’ (Nguyen et al., 2015), the 
authors show that ‘it is easy to produce images that 
are completely unrecognizable to humans, but that 
state-of-the-art DNNs believe to be recognizable 
objects with 99.99% confidence’. Using machine 
vision systems trained on ImageNet or similar large 
databases, and pairing these with evolutionary 
algorithms ‘that optimize images to generate high- 
confidence DNN predictions for each class in the 
dataset the DNN is trained on’ (Nguyen et al., 2015). 
The technical process for doing so is not my concern 
here, rather the character of the images and their 
relation to the type of understanding sought. 
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Figure 2: Fooling images as illustrated by Nguyen et al. 
(2015) 
The strangeness of these images is intriguing, 
funny, and of course deeply uncanny when thinking 
of how Maven and similar military projects already 
use machine vision to classify objects of concern in 
the battlefield (Allen, 2017). While the images in the 
lower panes betray some abstract symmetry and 
perhaps likeness to that which they are mistaken as, 
the images above show clearly that whatever 
machine understanding of images is, it is not vision. 
Thus while machine vision systems may perform 
well in terms of ‘actionable intelligence’, the gold 
standard of military superiority, the form of 
intelligence is fundamentally unrelated to what we 
call ‘vision’ in normal human interaction. Perhaps 
this is related to the introduction of engineering ideas 
such as ‘ground truth’ into the domain of changing 
social conventions that we call vision. 
Surprisingly, the errors uncovered here seem to be 
rather robust, as ‘it is not easy to prevent the DNNs 
from being fooled by retraining them with fooling 
images labeled as such. While retrained DNNs learn 
to classify the negative examples as fooling images, 
a new batch of fooling images can be produced that 
fool these new networks, even after many retraining 
iterations.’ (Nguyen et al., 2015, p. 2) 
3. ART PHOTOGRAPHY AND TECHNOLOGICAL
VISION 
Art photographer Richard Mosse’s Infra photo series 
and its video component the enclave uses Kodak 
Aerochrome, a discontinued military 
reconnaissance film, to portray scenes from eastern 
Congo. The film has an extra infrared exposure layer 
which enables it to register chlorophyll in live 
vegetation, and was used during the Korea and Viet 
Nam wars for aerial vegetation surveillance, and 
deployed to reveal camouflage. According to the 
producer it is ‘an infrared-sensitive, false-color 
reversal film intended for various aerial photographic 
applications where infrared discriminations may 
yield practical results’ (Kodak, 2005, my italics). The 
way in which the Aerochrome film produces these 
practical results is by colouring plants with 
living/active chlorophyll – the agent of 
photosynthesis – pink; while leaving the dead 
organic or non-organic material used in 
camouflaging efforts in its original colours. The result 
is beautiful images rendered with an array of shades 
of pink, landscapes and portraits of beauty but also 
of suspicion. 
The film was at its time a way of military vision, 
‘developed by the US military in the 1940s to detect 
camouflage and to reveal part of the spectrum of 
light the human eye cannot see.’ (Stearns, 2011) 
thus permitting the military using it to see through the 
deception strategies deployed by adversaries. 
As explained by the producer, ‘[c]olor infrared- 
sensitive films were originally designed for 
reconnaissance and camouflage detection. In fact, 
the term “CD” was once used to denote the 
camouflage detection role of this film. 
In Infra, Mosse uses Aerochrome to take pictures of 
scenes in Eastern Congo, in areas torn by a brutal 
and decades-long civil war that for western 
spectators offers no easy distinctions between 
‘good’ and ‘evil’. This visual strangeness of the 
conflict is important as ‘the sense derived from seen 
objects is not merely a function of the degree of 
optical resolution; it derives from the projects and 
culturally induced expectations of the observer’ 
(Shapiro, 2009, p. 66). With soldiers and militants in 
Congo lacking markers that would distinguish them 
visually as friend and enemy, perpetrator or 
protector, Mosse achieves a distanciation of the 
western spectator that perhaps can serve to make 
this spectator sensible to the agency of the sensing 
technology. 
In Infra, the erratic colouring becomes dizzying 
rather than legible, a destabilizing effect of the pink 
‘magic’ of showing the world unknown to us in terms 
of foliage and deception, a beautiful constraint on 
intelligibility rather than actionable military 
intelligence. The Aerochrome film makes everyday 
images surreal – beautiful, perhaps, but also 
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confusing. To Mosse, this misfit was what stirred his 
interest in using the film in Congo, remarking that ‘it 
seemed inappropriate and made me feel slightly 
uncomfortable’ (Rebibo, 2014). 
Crucially, Mosse’s Aerochrome images are opaque 
and hard to read operationally, their distribution of 
real and unreal unreliable and confusing rather than 
readily providing the ‘actionable intelligence’ touted 
by military visualization technology producers and 
users. It reveals a world of technologically enhanced 
vision that questions its own applicability. Soldiers 
are marked as living plant materials, civilian housing 
stands out marked as dangerous, landscapes full of 
suspicion meet us and there appears to be at least 
as many questions after the use of the film as there 
were before. Where the filmic technology promises 
to extend our bodily abilities of seeing to leave us 
with a clearer view of opaque battlefields and ‘detect 
enemy positions in the underbrush’ (Stearns, 2011), 
Mosse exposes the visual fragility of such a 
technology that is extremely fragile both in 
representative and practical ways – it must be kept 
cold until exposure, and only very few studios can 
develop it. 
Most observers have called attention to the way in 
which the resulting photography plays with tropes of 
Congo and Africa as the ‘dark continent’, and truly it 
does. But it is also able to ‘make us call into question 
pictures we thought we understood.’ (Stearns, 
2011) and, I think, asks us to question their 
apparatuses of distinction they are part of (Perugini 
and Gordon, 2017), the militarized technologies we 
are being asked to believe in but which we are not 
given access to scrutinize. 
4. CONCLUSION
The lethal ways of seeing enacted in militarized 
visual sensing systems depend on our trust in the 
visual technologies as ways of knowing the social 
and natural world. This trust, then, forms the basis 
for the enactment of a ‘sovereign gaze’ that can 
support security decisions by producing actionable 
intelligence (Amoore, 2007). Technological 
controversies reveal the utopianism underpinning 
even modest military machine vision projects, such 
as project Maven’s effort towards autonomous 
labelling of 38 classes of objects, as these rely on 
much smaller training databases than their 
impressive but also fragile civilian counterparts. 
Despite their virtues – including superior databases 
and international competitions to spur development 
– these systems are prone to not only systematic
misrecognition but to systematic miscecognition of 
fundamentally non-iconic images as objects. 
Decades ago, Haraway pointed to the wider agency 
of devices of vision, remarking how ‘the “eyes” made 
available in modern technological sciences shatter 
any idea of passive vision; these prosthetic devices 
show us that all eyes, including our own organic 
ones, are active perceptual systems, building in 
translations and specific ways of seeing’ (Haraway, 
1991, p. 190). What the scatter peacocks 
misrecognized by machine vision tell about, is not 
only an active perceptual system but a 
fundamentally non-human one. Whatever this 
technology does, vision is not an appropriate 
description. With Richard Mosse’s art photography 
project Infra, we can peer through disused military 
visual prosthetics to scrutinize a warzone as the 
militarized visual technologies of the past would do. 
Thus we can appreciate that not only is 
technological vision transformative, it contains an 
inescapable and hidden layer of uncertainty, 
confusion and mess that is being erased in the 
conversion of seeing – an always subjective, deeply 
personal and unstable biological-cultural faculty 
(Lyon, 1994) – into a militarized form of knowing. 
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